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ARGUMENT 
Kenworthy Issue #1 
Response to Point #1 
Ms. Kenworthy asserts that Goldenwest did not preserve the issue that this was 
an installment agreement. 
To preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that 
issue. To provide the court this opportunity, (1) the issue must be raised 
in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a 
party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. A 
party may not preserve an issue by merely mentioning it. We have 
explained that ultimately, the preservation requirement is based on the 
premise that, in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to 
be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, 
correct it. 
In re Guardianship of ATIG, 293 P.3d 276, 283, 2014 UT 88 ~ 2l(Utah 2012) 
(Internal quotations omitted). 
The issue is not whether this is an installment contract. The issue is whether 
the cause of action accrued and expired before commencement of this Action. The 
fact that this is an installment contract requires a court to analyze accrual of the cause 
of action differently than if there were no installments. That Golden west addressed 
accrual of the cause of action with greater specificity on appeal, is not an issue that 
needs to be separately stated and preserved; it is an argument directed at the issue of 
accrual. Nonetheless, if this Court believes analysis of accrual, as it relates to an 
installment contract, is a sub-issue within the analysis of accrual or a distinct issue, it 
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was preserved. 
In the Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Goldenwest argued that the cause of action did not accrue the day after payment of 
the May installment - on May 10, 2008. [R. 74,75,77-78] Rather, Goldenwest argued 
that the cause of action did not accrue until Ms. Kenworthy missed her installment 
payment on June 15, 2008. [R. 74,75, 77-78] Goldenwest's position on summary 
judgment and Goldenwest's position on appeal was that under the terms of the 
Agreement between Ms. Kenworthy and Goldenwest, Ms. Kenworthy was required to 
make monthly payments by the 15th of each month. [R. 75, ,r3] Therefore, each 
payment was a separate obligation of performance and when Ms. Kenworthy 
performed on May 9, 2008, her next duty to perform was by no later than June 15, 
2008. [R. 77-79] Thus, Ms. Kenworthy breached the Agreement when she missed the 
payment scheduled for June 15, 2008 (and all subsequent payments), and the cause of 
action for each breach accrued as each payment was missed. Since Goldenwest 
argued accrual of the cause of action as it related to these installments, the issue is 
preserved for appeal. 
Goldenwest acknowledges that, in its Statement of Issues, it omitted specific 
references in its opening brief to where the individual issues were preserved for 
appeal. This is not a basis to deny the appeal. Instead, Goldenwest provides the 
following list, in order to correct this minor ministerial error: 
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Issue #1: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, 
concluding this action was barred by Goldenwest's failure to timely commence 
this action under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-307. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in Goldenwest's Memorandum 
in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. [R.77-79] 
Issue #2: Whether a genuine issue of material facts exists concerning whether 
the agreement for Ms. Kenworthy to pay $200.00 per month was a separate 
oral agreement or modification of the written contact between Ms. Kenworthy 
and Goldenwest. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in Goldenwest's Sur Reply 
Memorandum. [R.139-140] 
Issue #3: Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Ms. 
Kenworthy, as the prevailing party under the contract. 
A reversal of attorney fees is sought if this Court reverses the decision 
of the trial court and applies the six-year statute of limitations for 
written contracts, rather than the four-year statute of limitations for oral 
contracts. In that event, Ms. Kenworthy would not have the reciprocal 
right to attorney fees under UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-5-826. [R. 175-176] 
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Response to Point #2 
Ms. Kenworthy next argues that the installments were accelerated when she 
wrecked her vehicle and Goldenwest accepted insurance proceeds. Since the loan 
was insured, Goldenwest made a claim against the insurance policy and received a 
distribution of insurance proceeds [R. 85-86, ,r 7] that were applied to the loan. Ms. 
Kenworthy, however, cites no terms of the loan agreement stating that acceptance of 
insurance proceeds accelerated the debt, nor does she provide any legal authority 
holding that acceptance of insurance proceeds accelerates the debt. Rather, she argues 
that accepting the proceeds can be inferred as intent to accelerate. Brief of Appellee, 
pp. 10-11. However, on summary judgment all inferences are taken in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. InnoSys, Inc. v. Mercer, 2015 UT 80, note 6 ("It is 
black letter law that an appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal 
quotations and citations omitted)). Thus, in the absence of the contract terms or legal 
authority for this conclusion, there is no basis for the Court to derive the conclusion 
that the payment of the insurance proceeds resulted in an acceleration of Ms. 
Kenworthy' s obligation. Moreover, since this an appeal from summary judgment, 
any inference to this effect must be resolved in favor of Goldenwest. 
Response to Point #3 
Ms. Kenworthy next argues that the agreement to reduce the payment to 
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$200.00 per month is an oral agreement; and therefore, should be governed by the 
four-year statute of limitations. This argument is premised on the conclusion of the 
Utah Supreme Court in Strand v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 6 Utah 2d 279; 312 P.2d 
561 (Utah 1957). 
Strand was not presented by Ms. Kenworthy in any of her briefing. Instead, 
the trial court did its independent research and cited this case in its opinion, 
concluding that whether the agreement to reduce the payments was a separate oral 
agreement or an oral modification of a written agreement, the four-year statute of 
limitations applies; and as a result, the lawsuit was filed beyond the statute of 
limitations. [R. 171] 
Strand is the only case in Utah holding that a contract, which is partially oral 
and partially written, will be treated as an oral agreement. In adopting this rule, the 
Utah Supreme Court did not provide any significant policy basis for the rule or 
delineate the scope of its application. Rather, the Court adopted the rule from a series 
of Texas opinions and applied it under the specific facts and circumstances of Strand. 
In the absence of an explanation for the adoption of the rule or the application of the 
rule, however, it is clear that the rule of Strand should not be absolute, but should be 
applied with consideration of the circumstances under a particular case. Indeed, under 
a strict application of Strand, any oral change, no matter how minor, would convert a 
written agreement to an oral agreement for purposes of the statute of limitations. This 
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hardly seems reasonable. 
For that reason, Goldenwest provided the Court with additional cases from 
Texas and other jurisdictions which apply this rule and have identified exceptions to 
this rule. Among those exceptions are circumstances where there is a sufficient 
amount of written evidence to derive the oral terms objectively. Similarly, where the 
partly oral and partly written agreements within the statute of frauds meet the 
requirements of an exception to the statute of frauds, the partly oral/partly written rule 
does not apply. 
Goldenwest then provided this Court with the analysis of the circumstances in this 
case, to show the agreement to reduce payments here can be objectively analyzed and 
complies with the partial performance exception to the statute of frauds. For these 
reasons, the partly oral/partly written rule of Strand should not be applied. 
Kenworthy Issue #2 
Response to Point #1 
Ms. Kenworthy next argues that Goldenwest bears the burden of establishing 
whether the agreement to reduce the payment was a modification or an oral 
agreement. On summary judgment, where the moving party bears the burden of proof 
at trial, the duty of that party on summary judgment is to provide sufficient evidence 
to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. If the moving party meets this 
burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that a genuine issue of 
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material fact exists. Orvis v. Johnson 2008 UT 2, 177 P .3d , 600, 604-605119 (2008). 
Here, Ms. Kenworthy argued that the four-year oral statute of limitations 
applies to the case. Since the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, it is her 
burden to prove. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Financial, Inc., 974 P.2d 288, 1999 UT 
13, note 8; Taylor v. Johnson, 414 P.2d 575, 577, 18 Utah 2d 16 (Utah 1966); 
Messick v. PHD Trucking Serv., Inc. 615 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1980). Thus Ms. 
Kenworthy must prove why this is an oral agreement governed by the four-year 
statute of limitations, rather than a written agreement governed by the six-year statute 
of limitations. Whether an oral agreement is a modication or separate agreement, is a 
question of fact. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994). 
Response to Point #2 
Ms. Kenworthy next appears to argue that the change in the payment amount 
cannot be a modification because it was a change in payment amount, rather than a 
change in payment dates. On this basis, she seeks to distinguish this case from Fisher 
v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1995). However, Fisher was cited as authority 
for the proposition that the minor change to an agreement is a modification, as 
opposed to a separate oral agreement. Whethere the minor change is to payment dates 
or payment amounts is immaterial, particularly where the modified term can be 
proven or objectively derived from documentary evidence. 
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Response to Point #3 
Ms. Kenworthy then argues that Strand is improperly distinguished from the 
present case. The changes to the written agreement in Strand were substantial 
modifications of multiple terms. In this case, the change to the Agreement was a 
reduction to the amount of the monthly payment. Additionally, since Strand provides 
no explanation for the application of the rule, it is appropriate for the Court to apply 
Strand in consideration of the full scope of oral agreements; modifications; and oral 
changes to contracts. 
Response to Point #4 
Ms. Kenworthy then argues that the application of the statute of frauds case 
law from Texas is not relevant. The Supreme Court, however, drew the partly 
oral/partly written rule from Texas case law in Strand. Thus, other cases in Texas 
explaining exceptions to the application of the rule are relevant because that provides 
context to the application and operation of the rule. Additionally, the application of 
the statute of frauds analysis gives context to the rule and limits upon where it should 
be applied and where it should be suspended. Therefore, the use of those cases is 
relevant. 
Response to Point #5 
Ms. Kenworthy then states that the change to the payment amount does not satisfy 
the statute of frauds because the terms are not clear and definite. This is not the case. 
Page 18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Agreement was for Ms. Kenworthy to pay $200.00 per month and she did. Her 
credit card receipt shows this, and it is difficult to conceive of what could be more 
definite. 
Response to Point #6 
Ms. Kenworthy then argues that the six-year statute of limitations is 
inapplicable under Strand and that Strand has been improperly cited for the 
proposition that an objective standard for determining price is governed by a written 
instrument. While this was not the express holding of the facts in Strand, this is a 
statement of law made by the Supreme Court in Strand that distinguishes the present 
case from the facts and circumstances of Strand. Thus, by stating that a written 
promise which can be ascertained by an objective standard falls within the written 
statute of limitations, an exception to the rule applied by the trial court exists. 
Response to Point #7 
Ms. Kenworthy then indicates that Goldenwest must resort to parole evidence, 
in order to prove the case, and Ms. Kenworthy makes reference to a number of items 
which she believes must be proven with parol. However, aside from foundation, this 
evidence is written not oral: 
1. Amount of the payment can be proven by her credit card receipt; 
2. Balance on the note can be shown the the note, checks and other payment 
documents, and calulation; 
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3. The payment schedule; and 
Therefore, aside from foundational evidence to identify and explain these documents, 
there is oral testimony needed. Notably, foundational testimony is necessary for any 
document presented for admission without stipulation. 
Kenworthy Issue #3 
Response to Points #1 & #2 
Ms. Kenworthy claims Goldenwest cannot ask the Court to overturn the award 
of fees because it did not object to the award of fees. While Goldenwest's prior 
counsel did not file an objection the award of fees, Goldenwest's argument on appeal 
is premised on the fact that if the Court reverses summary judgment, the outcome of 
this lawsuit is still in dispute. Since Ms. Kenworthy relied upon the attorney fee 
provision in the Agreement allowing fees to Goldenwest [R. 111], and reciprocal fee 
provision of UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-5-826 [R. 175-176], a reversal of the judgment 
would necessarily mean Ms. Kenworthy is no longer a prevailing party and the legal 
condition upon which fees are based, will no longer exist. This will require a reversal 
of Ms. Kenworthy' s award of fees from the trial court and eliminate her right to fees 
on appeal. 
Response to Point #3 
Finally, Ms. Kenworthy requests fees on appeal for sanctions against 
Goldenwest under Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, indicating that the appeal is 
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without merit; without a reasonable likelihood of success; and that it would result in a 
delay of the proper judgment. Goldenwest, however, has presented a reasonable basis 
for the appeal founded on facts and founded on law. Ms. Kenworthy's attempts to try 
to characterize this as a frivolous appeal or as one which is not justifiable, are 
inappropriate. While she may disagree with Goldenwest's position and the arguments 
that have been asserted, the fact remains that she entered into an Agreement with 
Goldenwest to borrow money and purchase a vehicle. Goldenwest fully performed 
that contract. Her dismissal against Goldenwest was based upon the statute of 
limitations, not on a substansive defense to the debt. The fact that Ms. Kenworthy has 
so far escaped liability, does not mean that she is forgiven of the debt. If, through 
procedural errors, Ms. Kenworthy is ultimately not held legally responsible to pay the 
debt, the fact remains that she has not paid Goldenwest the money as promised and 
Goldenwest is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to use the judicial system to be able 
to recover the amount that she undisputedly owes. Therefore, sanctions are 
unmerited. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Golden west asks this Court to reverse the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment and conclude that the statute of limitations for 
written agreements, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-309, governs the time for 
filing this action; that the reduction of the payment amount is a medication to the 
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Original Agreement; and reverse the award of attorney fees to Ms. Kenworthy. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi~ 10th day of March, 2016. 
OWLES, P.C. 
Dana T. Farmer 
Attorney for Appellant 
Goldenwest Federal Credit Union 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies and one (1) searchable CD 
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF were mailed by first-class mail with 
postage fully prepaid this I 0th day of March, 2016, to the following: 
Peter A. Klc. 
P.A. C. Law 
4 725 So. Holladay Blvd., Ste. 110 
Salt Lake City UT 84117 
peter@pak-law.com 
Attorney for Ms. Kenworthy 
Page I 12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
(Pursuant to Rule 24(t)(l)(C)) 
I hereby certify that Appellant's Brief is compliant with the type-volume 
limitations of Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant's Reply Brief 
contains 2,577 words. 
Respectfully submitted this I 0th day of M ch, 2016. 
KNOWLES, P.C . 
...._____. .-----:--
/tA,C I . -=/2r / jvt,v 
DANA T. FARMER 
Attorney for Goldenwest Fed. Credit Union 
Page I 13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
